Church History and Historical Theology

As Alexander Campbell (1788-1866) began his vast literary output in America, it became clear that he had resolutely rejected the traditional Reformed views of regeneration, conversion, and the work of the Spirit he had once held. In this paper, I examine Campbell’s distinctive views alongside those of his coreligionist, Barton W. Stone (1772-1844). Campbell, like most nineteenth century American Protestants, was heavily indebted to Scottish Common Sense Philosophy (SCSP). Campbell’s debt to SCSP was so great, I contend, that it caused him to re-envision the cluster of doctrines surrounding regeneration. His debt to SCSP is clearly illustrated by his optimism that the human mind functioned reliably enough to receive the testimony of God. This optimism about the proper functioning of the human mind caused him to reject traditional Reformed positions on these doctrines—especially such notions as depravity and human inability. Campbell’s distinct articulation of these contentious doctrines provides a critical lens for determining the degree of influence SCSP had on one of the emerging populist streams of American Christianity in the nineteenth century.

Philip Rousseau acknowledges that Basil’s Hexaemeral Homilies are perhaps the “clearest expression of his mature thought” (1994: 319).  In reflecting on the origin of the cosmos and the place of humans within it, Basil also reflects on the goal of human life.  Given the context in which these sermons were probably preached, it is no surprise that Basil does not offer an exposition of Genesis 1-3 as philosophically dense as his brother might have liked (GNys, In Hex., 4).  In this paper, I argue that while not philosophically pedestrian, Basil’s Hexaemeral Homilies were not intended to be a dense philosophical exposition.  They were, rather, paraenetic homilies wherein Basil urged his hearers to live the paradisical life of Genesis 1-3.
       
Scholarly debate regarding these homilies has often focused on Basil’s rejection of allegory.  I, however, focus on the use to which Basil turns his decidedly paraenetic exegesis of the opening chapters of Genesis.  I contend that Basil’s exegesis of scripture—particularly the opening chapters of Genesis—was an integral part of the ascetical practice Basil enjoined on his fellow Christians.  Where other scholars have focused on Basil’s exegetical techniques, I explore the concrete, practical, and ascetical applications of Basil’s exegesis.  Furthermore, this tendency was already present in nuce in Basil’s earlier works.  Examination of a few key passages from Basil’s earlier works will demonstrate that reflections on the creation account spanned Basil’s career and are an important source for understanding the goal to which his asceticism is ordered.  In short, my contention is that Basil’s exegesis of Genesis 1-3 provided an important building-block for his asceticism and that this asceticism was ordered toward a repristination of the cosmos and human life—a return to the paradise of Genesis 1-3.

As Alexander Campbell (1788-1866) began his vast literary output in America, it became clear that he had resolutely rejected the traditional Reformed views of regeneration, conversion, and the work of the Spirit he had once held. In this paper, I examine Campbell’s distinctive views alongside those of his coreligionist, Barton W. Stone (1772-1844). Campbell, like most nineteenth century American Protestants, was heavily indebted to Scottish Common Sense Philosophy (SCSP). Campbell’s debt to SCSP was so great, I contend, that it caused him to re-envision the cluster of doctrines surrounding regeneration. His debt to SCSP is clearly illustrated by his optimism that the human mind functioned reliably enough to receive the testimony of God. This optimism about the proper functioning of the human mind caused him to reject traditional Reformed positions on these doctrines—especially such notions as depravity and human inability. Campbell’s distinct articulation of these contentious doctrines provides critical lens for determining the degree of influence SCSP had on one of the emerging populist streams of American Christianity in the nineteenth century.

Scholarly discussions of Origen’s Christology often treat Origen as either proto-Arian or proto-Nicene, and though Origen’s Christology was certainly an important part of those later debates, attempts to read it as either continuous or discontinuous with Nicaea frequently fail to take into account the context in which Origen was actually writing.  That is, the impulse to pull Origen’s thought directly into the orbit of Nicaea often precludes the development of a full account of the context in which Origen’s theology was initially constructed.

This paper, then, is an attempt to take seriously one polemical context in which Origen was forming his early Christology.  In contrast to recent scholarship that prefers a broad view, I focus on a close reading of books 1-2 of Origen’s Commentary on John (ComJn) through the lens of the Monarchian controversy with which Origen would have come into contact in Rome.  I first use the testimony of Tertullian and Hippolytus, supplemented by the accounts of Ernest Evans (1948) and Ronald Heine (1998), to establish the broad contours of the Monarchian controversy.  This reconstruction then serves as the backdrop against which I read ComJn 1-2.  The paucity of references to Heracleon in ComJn 1-2 suggests that Origen was countering other views than those of his Valentinian opponent.  I demonstrate that many of Origen’s statements in ComJn 1-2 are helpfully elucidated when read with reference to the Monarchian controversy, which I argue was crucial for Origen’s articulation of the distinction between the Father and Son.

This paper examines the reception of Origen in Thomas Aquinas’ Lectures on John.  Scholars frequently note that the church fathers were an important source for Thomas’ theology, and they typically lament that his use of the fathers has not received more scholarly attention.  The scant attention scholars devote to the topic is mostly general and summary in nature.  By focusing on Thomas’ reception of Origen, this paper adds detail and texture in order to augment the existing surveys.  The paper begins with a review of scholarly accounts of Thomas’ use of the fathers and examines the broad place of the fathers in his theology.  After this introductory work, the focus narrows to Thomas’ use of Origen in the first chapter of his Lectures on John.  Thomas had Origen’s Commentary on John translated into Latin during his preparation of the Catena, thus reintroducing it to the West.  This study examines places where Thomas interacts with Origen—particularly passages where trinitarian themes come to the fore.  Viewing Thomas’ appraisals side-by-side with Origen’s original, this examination brings Thomas’ tendencies into sharp focus.  This study finds that Thomas’ concern to safeguard the divinity of the Son guided his reception of Origen.  Furthermore, it demonstrates that Thomas faithfully represented Origen’s thought—even when he sharply refuted Origen for a specific teaching.  It concludes that Thomas read Origen sympathetically even when he was critiquing his theology on the basis of fully developed creedal Christianity.

The majority of scholars have narrated the Monarchian controversy as a conflict between the simple laity (Monarchians) and the educated, philosophical Logos theologians. Although this tension is certainly at play in the controversy, I argue that in its earliest phase, the controversy revolved around an exegetical debate about monotheism and the divinity of Jesus. This observation has also been made by scholars of Rabbinic Judaism—specifically Alan Segal and Daniel Boyarin. Each of them contends that Rabbinic arguments against “two powers” and Monarchianism are connected in some way. Boyarin goes so far as to claim that the discursive interplay between the two was one of the chief means of “inscribing boundaries” between Judaism and Christianity.

In this paper, I begin by examining the earliest layer of “two powers” material, which is located in the Sifre to Deuteronomy and the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael. Following this analysis, I reconstruct the exegetical contours of the Monarchian positions in the two earliest works attesting to Monarchianism—Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum and Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean. Having laid out the primary texts from the Monarchians and Rabbis, I assess the claims of Segal and Boyarin in two stages. First, I establish which texts were employed by the respective authors in an attempt to find overlap (or a shared exegetical pattern) between the Rabbinic and early Christian texts. Second, I attempt to discern the foci of the two different controversies—what key issues vexed the respective polemicists. Finally, I conclude that despite the superficial similarities noticed by Segal and Boyarin, the texts do not support Boyarin’s contention that there was a dynamic interplay between these two controversies. They were parallel, but not directly connected, debates about monotheism in the late-second and early-third centuries C.E.

Scholarly discussions of Origen’s Christology often treat Origen as either proto-Arian or proto-Nicene, and though Origen’s Christology was certainly an important part of those later debates, attempts to read it as either continuous or discontinuous with Nicaea frequently fail to take into account the context in which Origen was actually writing.  That is, the impulse to pull Origen’s thought directly into the orbit of Nicaea often precludes the development of a full account of the context in which Origen’s theology was initially constructed.

This paper, then, is an attempt to take seriously one polemical context in which Origen was forming his early Christology.  In contrast to recent scholarship that prefers a broad view, I focus on a close reading of books 1-2 of Origen’s Commentary on John (ComJn) through the lens of the Monarchian controversy with which Origen would have come into contact in Rome.  I first use the testimony of Tertullian and Hippolytus, supplemented by the accounts of Ernest Evans (1948) and Ronald Heine (1998), to establish the broad contours of the Monarchian controversy.  This reconstruction then serves as the backdrop against which I read ComJn 1-2.  The paucity of references to Heracleon in ComJn 1-2 suggests that Origen was countering other views than those of his Valentinian opponent.  I demonstrate that many of Origen’s statements in ComJn 1-2 are helpfully elucidated when read with reference to the Monarchian controversy, which I argue was crucial for Origen’s articulation of the distinction between the Father and Son.

Scholars have variously assessed what, if any, relationship there was between Monarchianism and Gnosticism in the late second and early third centuries. In his translation of Adversus Praxean, Earnest Evans concludes that there was no connection between the two, although he offers little evidence to substantiate his assertion. Reinhard M. Hübner, Adolf von Harnack, and others have argued that Monarchianism was at least partially directed against Gnosticism. To date, Hübner's work on the relationship between Monarchianism and Gnosticism has been the most thorough. This paper addresses the relationship between Monarchianism and Gnosticism by analyzing competing interpretations of passages from Isaiah 44-45.

"I am the LORD, and there is no other" is the constant refrain in the polemic against idolatry in Isaiah 44-45. This refrain became an integral piece in debates about monotheism in the late second century. The Apocryphon of John ironically puts these words on the lips of Ialdabaoth, who is unaware that there is in fact another God who is higher than he. Both Contra Noetum and Tertullian's Adversus Praxean attest to the fact that the Monarchians were using these verses in order to support their rigid understanding of monotheism. They deployed this refrain from Isa. 44-45 in order to deny any distinction within the Godhead. By assessing uses of this refrain from Isaiah, I argue that the Monarchians were opposing certain types of Gnostic teaching as well as more mainstream articulations of distinction between the Father and Son.

This article examines claims made by Alan Segal and Daniel Boyarin that the Monarchian controversy and rabbinic polemics against “powers in heaven” were connected. The arguments of Segal and Boyarin are more suggestive than concrete. In order to assess these claims, I undertake a close reading of the earliest layer of texts from the Monarchian controversy and rabbinic polemic against “powers in heaven.” After highlighting the salient features from the Monarchian controversy, I examine key Tannaitic “powers in heaven” texts. Ultimately, I contend that there is no evidence that the Monarchians had any contact with the early rabbinic sages and that the similarities Boyarin and Segal recognized are only superficial.

Scholars have variously assessed what, if any, relationship there was between monarchianism and Gnosticism in the late second and early third centuries. In his translation of Adversus Praxean, Earnest Evans concludes that there was no connection between the two, although he offers little evidence to substantiate his assertion. Reinhard M. Hübner, Adolf von Harnack, and others have argued that monarchianism was at least partially directed against Gnosticism. To date, Hübner’s work on the relationship between monarchianism and Gnosticism has been the most thorough. This paper addresses the relationship between monarchianism and Gnosticism by analyzing competing interpretations of passages from Isaiah 44-45.

“I am the LORD, and there is no other” is the constant refrain in the polemic against idolatry in Isaiah 44-45. This refrain became an integral piece in debates about monotheism in the late second century. The Apocryphon of John ironically puts these words on the lips of Ialdabaoth, who is unaware that there is in fact another God who is higher than he. Both Contra Noetum and Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean attest to the fact that the monarchians were using these verses in order to support their rigid understanding of monotheism. They deployed this refrain from Isa. 44-45 in order to deny any distinction within the Godhead. By assessing uses of this refrain from Isaiah, I argue that the monarchians were opposing certain types of Gnostic teaching as well as more mainstream articulations of distinction between the Father and Son.

In the introduction to his translation of Peri Pascha, Campbell Bonner describes the theology of Melito of Sardis as “naïve modalism.” In this paper, I examine the claim that Melito was a modalist, naïve or otherwise. To that end, I contrast Melito’s alleged modalism with that of Noetus and Praxeas, both of whom Adolf von Harnack labeled “modalistic monarchians.” Noetus and Praxeas denied that there was any distinction between the Father and Son and often claimed that they were “one and the same” (Tertullian, Adversus Praxean, 2.3). Their theology had the explicit intention of safeguarding monotheism against perceived threats of Christological development. Although I prefer the term “monarchianism,” I argue that the explicit denial of distinction between the Father and Son and the concomitant identification of the two is the central feature of modalism.

Having established this portrait of modalism at the beginning of the third century, I return to the passages in Melito’s Peri Pascha that prompt Bonner and others to label him a modalist. Specifically, I focus on Peri Pascha, 81-96, which culminates with Melito claiming that the “sovereign has been insulted, the God has been murdered…” In this section, Melito neither claims that the Father and Son are “one and the same” nor explicitly denies their distinction. Instead, he describes the Son using language normally reserved for the Father. I argue that his lack of concern to distinguish the Father and Son is a product of his anti-Jewish polemic. He does not distinguish them precisely because he wants to accuse his Jewish opponents (real or purely rhetorical) of having killed none other than the God of Israel. In the end, Melito’s theology is of a fundamentally different character than that of Noetus and Praxeas and ought not be called modalism.